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Abstract
Previous studies find that some social groups are stuck in poverty traps because of network
effects. However, these studies do not carefully analyze how these groups overcome low hu-
man capital investment activities. Unlike previous studies, the model in this paper includes
network externalities in both the human capital investment stage and the subsequent career
stages. This implies that not only the current network quality, but also the expectations about
future network quality affect the current investment decision. Consequently, the coordinated
expectation among the group members can play a crucial role in the determination of the final
state. We define “overlap” for some initial skill ranges, whereby the economic performance
of a group can be improved simply by increasing expectations of a brighter future. We also
define “poverty trap” for some ranges, wherein a disadvantaged group is constrained by its
history, and we explore the egalitarian policies to mobilize the group out of the trap.
Keywords: Group Inequality, Network Externality, Overlap, Poverty Trap.
JEL Code: I30, J15, Z13
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1 Introduction
A human being is socially situated such that familial and communal resources explicitly influence his acqui-
sition of human capital through various routes, including through training resources, nutritional and medical
provision, after-school parenting, peer effects, role models, and even the psychological processes that shape
one’s outlook on life. Even after the skill acquisition period, one’s social network influences his economic success
through various routes, such as mentoring, job searches, business connections, and information channeling.
A number of theoretical works emphasize the network effects and the subsequent development bias that
generates between-group disparities. Some of these studies focus on network externalities in the human capital
investment stage. For example, Becker and Tomes (1979) and Loury (1981) explain the persistence in relative
economic status across generations via the effects of parental income on offspring’s education. Lundberg
and Startz (1998) argue that group disparities in earnings can persist indefinitely when the average level of
human capital in a community affects the accumulation of human capital of the following generations. In a
related work, Bowles, Loury and Sethi (2007) prove the instability of an equal society in a highly segregated
economy under the interpersonal spillovers in human capital accumulation and the production complementarity
between high and low skill labor. Other works focus on network externalities in the subsequent career stages.
For example, Montgomery (1991, 1994) suggests that the widespread use of employee referrals combined with
a tendency to refer others within individuals’ social networks might generate persistent inequalities between
groups of workers. More recently, Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson (2004, 2007) argue that differences in collective
employment histories and the consequent asymmetry of job information produce sustained inequality in wages
and drop-out rates across social groups.
Although theoretical works on the topic find that some groups are stuck in poverty traps because of network
effects, they do not provide a rich analysis of how these groups can overcome the low human capital investment
activities. In their models, multiple equilibria of skill investment rates are self-confirmed under the presence of
strong network externalities. What can we say about the skill levels between those stationary points? How can
a group with a lower skill investment rate change the skill investment behaviors of its group members? In the
theoretical models, players are assumed to be myopic. However, what if they are farsighted and can cooperate
with each other? This paper tries to answer these questions by suggesting that coordinated expectations
among group members play a critical role in the determination of a group’s skill investment activities.
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As mentioned earlier, previous studies focus on network externalities in either the human capital investment
stage or the subsequent career stages. Externalities in the former stage alter the cost to achieve skills and
those in the latter stages alter the benefits from skill investments. Unlike previous studies, the theoretical
model in this paper allows both types of externalities. Therefore, not only the current network quality, but also
the expectations regarding future network quality affect current invest decisions. This implies that multiple
equilibrium paths can exist for a certain range of initial skill levels. Within that range, a group’s economic
performance can be improved simply by increasing expectations for a brighter future. This provides rational
support for the argument that some social groups are not constrained by their history but can raise themselves
up “by their bootstraps.” However, some groups may suffer from very low network quality if their skill levels
are far below a certain range. This provides rational support for the argument that some groups may not
escape their low skill investment activities without external interventions.
This paper illustrates the mechanism through concrete examples. For network externalities in the human
capital investment stage, the change in a group’s status tends to be caused by factors in the past; by altering
skill investment cost, the current stock of network human capital directly affects the investment rate in a
newborn cohort. In contrast, for network externalities in the career stage, the change in a group’s status tends
to be affected by factors in the future; by altering the future benefits to skill acquisition, the expected success
of one’s network influences skill investment in an entering cohort.
The latter effect implies a unique feature of collective action: the possibility of group members acting
together to improve (or deteriorate) the quality of a group’s social network. For instance, suppose that a
group’s network quality is relatively poor but that a newborn cohort happens to believe that the quality of
the group’s network will be better in the future. If this belief leads more newborn group members to acquire
skills, then the next cohort will find that the overall network quality has improved due to the enhanced skill
investment of the previous cohort. If they and the following cohorts continue to hold the optimistic view toward
the future, they will maintain the enhanced skill investment rate and the quality of group’s social network
will improve over time – thereby justifying the optimistic beliefs of earlier cohorts. However, suppose that
the newborn cohort holds a pessimistic view that the network quality will be even worse in the future. Fewer
members invest in skill achievement because the expected benefits are fewer. If the following cohorts continue
to hold the pessimistic view, the network quality will deteriorate over time. Thus, this pessimistic belief
could also be self-fulfilling. This nature of possible collective actions stresses the importance of coordinated
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expectations across different time cohorts. Whether optimism or pessimism persists across cohorts determines
the final economic state of a social group.
However, collective action through coordinated beliefs may not be feasible for all social groups with unequal
network quality. For example, the skill improvement that occurs due to coordinated optimism may not be
feasible if the negative influence of the current network quality is too strong. This is the situation of “the
past” that traps disadvantaged groups.
Therefore, the analysis of the dynamic structure of network externalities focuses on the identification of
the network quality range in which both the optimistic and the pessimistic expectations are feasible for the
group members. Many theoretical papers including Murphy et al.(1989), Matsuyama(1991) and Kremer(1993)
highlights the importance of coordinated expectations in equilibrium determination. Among them, Krugman
(1991) denoted the range with multiple equilibrium paths by overlap in his influential argument for the
relative importance of history and expectations. In his argument, within an overlap, the final economic state
is determined by expectations toward the future, while it is determined by history outside an overlap.
Unlike their models with a fixed population, our model is developed based on the overlapping generation
framework. The model emphasizes the importance of belief coordination over the long-term horizon: the
expectations coordinated across the different time cohorts impact the dynamic path to be taken. In addition,
the model developed in the social externalities setting proves that the size of overlap is determined by the
relative strength of working-period network externalities over the skill investment period network externality.
Finally, the model provides some new perspectives on egalitarian policies such as affirmative action by
considering economic agents’ forward-looking behaviors. This point distinguishes the paper from other papers
concerning the egalitarian policies whose main focus is on the equilibrium analysis (e.g., Coate and Loury
1993, Fryer and Loury 2007). If the initial network quality of a social group is far below the “overlap”, the
group may be trapped by the negative influence of network effects, and an active state role is required to
enhance the group’s skill level to enter the “overlap”. However, if the network quality of a social group is
already in the overlap range, the active state role would not have a significant impact on the group’s skill level.
Instead, an emphasis on coordinated optimism among the disadvantaged group members should be pursued,
although this fact is often ignored in policy debates. Civic leaders, civic organizations, religious groups, and
governments may all contribute to the encouragement of collective optimism. Therefore, an effective policy
to mobilize a disadvantaged group out of the poverty trap first requires active governmental intervention and
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then requires societal belief coordination. A policy that fails in either respect cannot be successful in helping
the group to advance as much as an advantaged group.
The paper is organized into the following sections. Section 2 describes the basic structure of the model with
social network externalities. Section 3 develops the dynamic model with the newborn cohort’s forward-looking
decision making and the dynamic evolution of group skill levels. Section 4 identifies multiple stationary states
in the dynamic model. Section 5 identifies the equilibrium paths to those stationary states and the consequent
overlap. In Section 6, we discuss the egalitarian policies and some theoretical issues. Section 7 provides study
conclusions.
2 Social Externalities and Skill Investment Decision
Consider a social group with a large population of workers. A worker is subject to the “Poisson death process”
with parameter α: in a unit period, each individual faces α chances to die. We assume that the total population
of the group is constant at N , implying that the α fraction of the group’s population is replaced by newborn
group members in a unit period. Each worker is either skilled or unskilled. Let st ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction
of skilled workers in the group at time t, which is called the group skill level at time t. An agent’s neighbors
are n random draws from the group’s population (N), and n is large enough that the quality of an agent’s
network is approximately equal to the group skill level st.2
A newborn’s innate ability a is a random draw from a distribution G(a). Each newborn agent born with an
innate ability level a decides whether to be skilled or not during his early days of life. Each newborn individual
at time t makes a skill investment decision by comparing the cost of skill acquisition with the expected benefits
of investment. The cost to achieve a skill at time t depends on innate ability a ∈ (−∞,∞) and the quality
of social network at time t as suggested by Bowles, Loury and Sethi (2007): Ct ≡ C(a, st). The C(a, st) is a
decreasing function in both arguments a and st. The cost includes both the mental and physical costs that
are incurred for the skill achievement. The lower one’s innate ability or the worse the quality of one’s social
network, the more mentally stressful the skill acquisition process is or the more materials he must spend on
the achievement.
The expected benefits of investment to a newborn individual born at time t, Πt ∈ (0,∞), is the net benefits
2In the extreme case that n is equal to the population size minus one (N − 1), agents are all connected to one another. This
extreme network is called complete network in the network literature (Jackson, 2008).
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of his skill investment to be realized over his whole lifetime from time t until he dies. Let us assume the base
level salary for a skilled worker is w1 and w0 for an unskilled worker, in which w1 > w0. A worker’s neighbors
at time t are composed of the nst number of skilled workers and the n(1 − st) number of unskilled workers.
Let φij(x) denote the extra benefits of having x number of j type workers in a i type worker’s social network,
in which φij(0) = 0 for any i, j ∈ {s, u}.
First, φss(nst) denote the extra benefits of having nst skilled workers in a skilled worker’s social network,
which is an increasing function of nst. The benefits are both psychological and material. For instance, job
information flows along the synapses of the social network (Granovetter 1975). The more skilled workers he
has in his network, the more likely he is to find an appropriate job position for his specific skills (Holzer 1988).
A skilled worker can be more efficient in contacting customers and handling specific work troubles when he
has more skilled workers in his network (Ozgen and Baron 2007). He may gain comfort and mentoring from
the informal network, and the cost of maintaining jobs may decline with more skilled workers around him
(Castilla 2005, Rockoff 2008).
In the same way, unskilled workers such as car mechanics, construction workers and shop attendants would
obtain extra benefits from having unskilled workers in his network. φuu(n(1 − st)) denote the extra benefits
of having n(1− st) unskilled workers in an unskilled worker’s social network, which is an increasing function
of n(1 − st). For example, a car mechanic searching for a place to work for will find a car center that fits
his specialty better when he has more car mechanics in his network. He can be more efficient in handling
specific mechanical problems in his work when he can confer with more mechanics. A construction worker (or
a shop attendant) will have more chances to find new job openings with more construction workers (or shop
attendants) in his network.
Even a skilled worker may obtain extra benefits from having unskilled workers in his network, denoted by
φsu(n(1− st)) , but to a lesser degree than an unskilled worker would obtain: φ′su(n(1− st)) < φ′uu(n(1− st)).
In a symmetric way for having skilled workers, we have φ′us(nst) < φ
′
ss(nst). Thus, the net benefits of being
a skilled worker realized at time τ is ws + φss(nseτ ) + φsu(n(1 − seτ )) − wu − φuu(n(1 − seτ )) − φus(nseτ ), in
which seτ indicates the expected network quality at the future point of time τ . Replacing the baseline salary
differential ws−wu with δ¯, and φss(nseτ ) +φsu(n(1− seτ ))−φuu(n(1− seτ ))−φus(nseτ ) with f(seτ ), the lifetime
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net benefits of skill investment to an agent born at time t are summarized as
Πet =
∫ ∞
t
[δ¯ + f(seτ )]e
−(ρ+α)(τ−t)dτ, (1)
where ρ is a time-discounting factor and α is a Poisson death rate. Also note that f ′(seτ ) > 0, which implies
the social increasing returns emphasized by Acemoglu(1996). We assume that δ¯ is big enough that δ¯+f(0) > 0
so that the net benefits of being skilled is always positive. Thus, the net benefits of skill investment Πet are
an increasing function of both the baseline salary differential δ¯ and the sequences of expected network quality
{seτ}∞τ=t: Πet ≡ Π(δ¯, {seτ}∞τ=t). The higher rate of return on skill investment with the more skilled workers in
the social group seems natural with the existence of social network externalities as long as the group’s skill
level does not affect significantly the aggregate skill composition of the economy.3
An agent born at time t with an innate ability a commits a skill investment if and only if
C(a, st) ≤ Π(δ¯, {seτ}∞τ=t). (2)
The notable feature of this argument is that one’s skill investment is affected by both the current network
externalities in the skill acquisition period and the future network externalities over the labor market phase
of his career. The interplay between the two kinds of network externalities has not yet been explored by other
theoretical works including recent developments by Bowles et al. (2007) and Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson
(2004). The above formula generates a unique threshold ability level such that newborn individuals of the
social group whose innate ability is at least the threshold invest in the skill acquisition. Let us define a function
A that represents the unique threshold ability a˜: a˜t ≡ A(st,Πet ). Using the distribution of the innate ability
level G(a), the fraction of individuals born at time t who invest in the skill, denoted by xt, is expressed by
xt = 1−G(A(st,Πet )). (3)
3However, some scholars even suggest that the skill premium may depend positively on the the aggregate skill composition
given the market frictions. For example, Acemoglu (1996) develops a mechanism for social increasing returns that the rate
of return on human capital of a worker is increasing in the average human capital of the workforce when the labor market is
characterized by costly search.
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3 Dynamic System with Social Network Externalities
The skill investment of the newborns can be approximated by the following procedure. Consider a very short
time interval between t and t + ∆t. Suppose that, at the beginning of the interval, the randomly chosen
α∆t fraction of the group’s population, which is the N · α∆t number of workers, die, and the same number
of agents are newly born. The N · (1 − α∆t) workers of the group survive until t + ∆t. At the end of the
interval, the newborn agents incur the cost of skill achievement. Then, the threshold level of ability a˜ for
the skill investment is determined by the following equation: C(a˜, st) = Π(δ¯, {seτ}∞τ=t+∆t). The fraction of
the individuals who are born at time t who invest in skill (xt) is 1 − G(A(st,Πet+∆t)). The total number of
skilled workers at time t+ ∆t will be the sum of skilled workers in the surviving population and those in the
newborn cohort: N · (1−α∆t) · st +N ·α∆t · [1−G(A(st,Πet+∆t))]. Thus, the group skill level at time t+ ∆t
is approximated as
st+∆t ≈ (1− α∆t) · st + α∆t · [1−G(A(st,Πet+∆t))]. (4)
Rearranging the equation gives us
∆st
∆t
≡ st+∆t − st
∆t
≈ α [1−G(A(st,Πet+∆t))− st] . (5)
Taking ∆t→ 0, we achieve the evolution rule of a group’s skill level st,
s˙t = α [1−G(A(st,Πet ))− st] . (6)
This can be expressed as s˙t = α [xt − st] because of equation (3). If the fraction of newborn agents who invest
in skill (xt) is greater than the current skill level of the group (st), the network quality improves at time t.
Otherwise, it declines.
Also, taking the derivative with respect to time t in equation (1), we have the evolution rule of the net
benefits of skill investment Πet ,
Π˙et = (ρ+ α)
[
Πet −
δ¯ + f(st)
ρ+ α
]
. (7)
If a normalized level of the currently accrued benefits of being skilled
(
δ¯+f(st)
ρ+α
)
is greater than the lifetime
benefits of being skilled that are expected to accrue from now until death (Πet ), the lifetime benefits of being
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skilled expected to accrue from the next time point t + ∆t to the death (Πet+∆t) would be smaller than its
current level: Πet+∆t < Π
e
t . If they are equal, the lifetime net benefits of skill investment would not change
within the short time interval ∆t: Πet+∆t = Π
e
t .
The group skill level st is constantly adjusted by the level of skill investments among the newborn cohort,
which means that it is a flow variable, which cannot make a sudden jump at a point of time. However, the
lifetime benefits of skill investment Πet depend on the expectations about future network quality. By altering
the expectation of {seτ}∞τ=t, the lifetime benefits can make a sudden jump at any point of time. Thus, it is
a jumping variable. The dynamic system with network externalities that includes a flow variable st and a
jumping variable Πet is therefore summarized by the following equations:
s˙t = α(xt − st), in which xt = 1−G(A(st,Πet )), (8)
Π˙et = (ρ+ α)
[
Πet −
δ¯ + f(st)
ρ+ α
]
, (9)
and the two isoclines of the time dependent variables are represented by
s˙t = 0 Locus : st = 1−G(A(st,Πet )), (10)
Π˙et = 0 Locus : Π
e
t =
δ¯ + f(st)
ρ+ α
. (11)
For further analysis of this dynamic system without damaging its essential structure, we introduce the
following linear functional forms of the cost function C(a, st) and the benefits function f(st): C(a, st) =
c0−ψa−pst and f(st) = f0 +qst, where p represents the influence of the education period network externality,
and q represents the influence of the working period network externality. ψ represents the cost sensitivity to
the innate ability level a. The threshold ability level (a˜) for the skill achievement is obtained from the equation
C(a˜, st) = Πet :
A(st,Πet ) =
c0 − pst −Πet
ψ
. (12)
In order to avoid the massive complications, the model in this paper uses the above linear functional forms.
However, readers will be able to find that the major results of this paper are derived with the general forms
of the cost function C(a, st) and the benefits function f(st) without the artificial linearization.
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4 Multiple Steady States
In this section, we check the possible multiple steady states in the given dynamic system. We start with the
simplest case wherein the innate ability is equal across the population: a ≡ a¯. Then, we examine the case
with the general form of the ability distribution.
4.1 Steady States with Unique Ability Level
In the unique system with the equal innate ability a¯ , the investment rate among the newborns is either xt = 1
or xt = 0. All of the newborn agents at time t invest in skill achievements when the expected benefits are
no less than the cost: xt = 1 with Πet ≥ C(a¯, st)(= c0 − ψa¯ − pst). This implies that the equation s˙t = 0
holds when Πet ≥ c0 − ψa¯ − p and st = 1 as xt = st = 1. Also, for the given st = 1, the equation Π˙et = 0
holds when Πet =
δ¯+f0+q
ρ+α , according to equation (11). Therefore, there exists a steady state with st = 1 when
δ¯+f0+q
ρ+α ≥ c0 − ψa¯− p. Let us normalize δ¯ρ+α as δ¯′, which represents the lifetime level of the wage differential∫∞
t
δ¯ · e−(ρ+α)(τ−t)dτ , and normalize ρρ+α , f0ρ+α and qρ+α as ρ′, f ′0 and q′. The high investment rate with
xt = 1 and the high quality of the social network with st = 1 is a steady state when the composite network
externalities (p+ q′) are large enough that p+ q′ ≥ c0 − ψa¯− δ¯′ − f ′0.
None of the newborns invest in the skill when the expected benefits is smaller than the cost, xt = 0 with
Πet < C(a¯, st)(= c0 − ψa¯ − pst). This implies that the equation s˙t = 0 holds when Πet < c0 − ψa¯ and st = 0
as xt = st = 0. For the given st = 0, the equation Π˙et = 0 holds when Π
e
t =
δ¯+f0
ρ+α (equation (11)). Therefore,
another steady state that includes the low investment rate xt = 0 and the low quality social network with
st = 0 exists when the following holds: c0 −ψa¯− δ¯′ − f ′0 > 0. The two steady states are displayed in Figure 1
with the two isocline loci.
Proposition 1. Given a unique innate ability level a¯ for all the newborns and assuming c0−ψa¯− δ¯′−f ′0 > 0,
multiple steady states exist, (sl,Πl) = (0, δ¯′ + f ′0) and (sh,Πh) = (1, δ¯
′ + f ′0 + q
′) , if and only if the composite
network externalities (p+ q′) are big enough that p+ q′ ≥ c0 − ψa¯− δ¯′ − f ′0.
This proposition proves that sufficient network externalities must be present for multiple steady states to
exist. In addition, under the absence of network externalities, a unique steady state always exists. If the
base salary differential δ¯′ is big enough, then the high network quality (st = 1) is self-confirmed at the unique
steady state. Otherwise, the low network quality (st = 0) is self-confirmed.
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Corollary 1. Given a unique innate ability level a¯ for all the newborns, there exists a unique steady state
under the absence of network externalities (p = q = 0). The unique steady state is (1, δ¯′+f ′0) if δ¯
′ ≥ c0−ψa¯−f ′0
and (0, δ¯′ + f ′0) otherwise.
4.2 Steady States with Ability Distribution G(a)
In the simplest case with a unique ability label a¯, we have shown that the multiplicity of steady states is
generated by the influence of network externalities, and, without the network externalities, the multiplicity
is not achieved. In this section, we confirm this conclusion with the more general form of the innate ability
function G(a). Suppose G(a) is S-shaped. Then, there exists aˆ such that G(a)′′ > 0 for any a ∈ (−∞, aˆ) and
G(a)′′ < 0 for any a ∈ (aˆ,∞), which implies that its PDF g(a) has one peak at aˆ (e.g., a bell-shaped g(a)).
The s˙t = 0 locus in equation (10) is represented by (st,Πet )s that satisfy the following two equations, which
are associated with the threshold ability level (a˜) for the skill achievement.

st = 1−G(a˜)
a˜ = A(st,Πet )
(13)
The first is denoted by the solid curve in Panel A of Figure 2 in the (st, a˜) domain, and the second is denoted
by the dotted lines for each level of Πet (iso-Π lines) in the same panel. The slope of the s˙t = 0 locus is
obtained through the implicit function theorem: defining a function F as F = 1 − G(A(st,Πet )) − st, we
have dΠ
e
t
dst
∣∣
s˙t=0
(
≡ − FsFΠ
)
= −G′(a˜)·As+1G′(a˜)·AΠ . Because As = −pψ−1 and AΠ = −ψ−1 (equation (12)), we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. The slope at an arbitrary point (s′,Π′) on the s˙t = 0 locus is ψg(a˜′) − p, in which a˜′ = A(s′,Π′)
and a˜′ = G−1(1− s′).
For the specific ability level aˆ under which g(a) is maximized, the corresponding sˆ on the s˙t = 0 locus is
sˆ ≡ 1−G(aˆ), and the corresponding Πˆ is the Πet that satisfies aˆ = A(sˆ,Πet ): Πˆ ≡ c0 − ψaˆ− psˆ.
Suppose the Π˙et = 0 locus passes through the specific point (sˆ, Πˆ), as displayed in Panel B of Figure 2.
Note that the slope of the s˙t = 0 locus, ψg(a˜) − p, is minimized at the point because g(a˜) is maximized with
a˜ = aˆ. In this case, it is obvious that multiple steady states exist if and only if the slope of the Π˙et = 0 locus is
greater than that of the s˙t = 0 locus at the point (sˆ, Πˆ): q′ > ψg(aˆ) −p. Thus, we conclude that the multiplicity
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of the steady states is achieved when the composite influence of the network externalities measured by p+ q′
is big enough that p+ q′ > ψg(aˆ) .
Proposition 2. Suppose that the Π˙et = 0 locus passes through (sˆ, Πˆ) on the s˙t = 0 locus, in which A(sˆ, Πˆ) =
aˆ. Three steady states exist if and only if the composite network externalities (p + q′) are big enough that
p+ q′ > ψg(aˆ) .
Let us denote the three steady states by El(sl,Πl), Em(sm,Πm) and Eh(sh,Πh), in which sl < sm(= sˆ) <
sh, as displayed in Figure 2. With the low quality social network sl now and in the future, the expected
benefits of skill investment are low (Πl). With the low level of the network quality sl together with the low
level of benefits to investment Πl, the ability threshold for skill achievement among the newborns is high and
a relatively small fraction of the newborns invest in skills. In this manner, the low quality social network
is self-confirmed, which is represented by the steady state El(sl,Πl). With the high quality social network
sh now and in the future, the expected benefits of skill investment are high (Πh). With the high levels of
network quality (sh) and the net benefits to investment (Πh), the ability threshold for skill achievement is
lower and a relatively large fraction of the newborns invest in skills. Thus, the high quality social network is
also self-confirmed, which is represented by the steady state Eh(sh,Πh).
The existence of multiple steady states is possible only when the influence of network externalities is
sufficiently strong. Consider the economy under the absence of network externalities (p = q = 0). The Π˙et = 0
locus is flat because of q = 0: Πet = δ¯
′ + f ′0. The s˙t = 0 locus is Π
e
t = −ψG−1(1 − st) + c0 because of p = 0,
according to equations (10) and (12), which is a monotonically increasing function. Therefore, a unique steady
state always exists at (1−G((c0 − δ¯′ − f ′0)ψ−1), δ¯′ + f ′0) without the network externalities.
Corollary 2. A unique steady state (1−G((c0− δ¯′− f ′0)ψ−1), δ¯′+ f ′0) exists under the absence of the network
externalities (p = q = 0).
Proposition 2 can be generalized further as follows.
Theorem 1. If and only if the composite network externalities (p + q′) are big enough that p + q′ > ψg(aˆ) ,
does a range of the base salary differential [δ¯2, δ¯1] exist such that the multiple steady states exist with any δ¯
within the range: δ¯j = (ρ+α)(c0−ψG−1(1− sj)− (p+ q′)sj − f ′0),∀j ∈ {1, 2}, in which both s1 and s2 satisfy
g(G−1(1− sj)) = ψ(p+ q′)−1 and s1 < sˆ < s2. Otherwise, a unique steady state exists regardless of the base
salary differential level δ¯.
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Proof. For the proof, see the appendix. 
The theorem implies there are three steady states with δ¯ between δ¯2 and δ¯1 given p + q′ > ψg(aˆ) and two
with either δ¯ = δ¯2 or δ¯ = δ¯1 because the Π˙et = 0 locus is tangent to the s˙t = 0 locus. The above theorem
confirms the importance of network externalities in generating multiple steady states. If the influence of
network externalities (p+ q′) is weak, the different steady states never include multiple social groups. When
the influence is sufficiently strong, however, we can have multiple social groups at the steady states with the
different network qualities.
5 Dynamic Equilibrium Paths
In this section, we identify the converging dynamic paths to the steady states and provide the economic
interpretation of the paths.
5.1 Dynamic Paths with Unique Ability Level
In the simplest case of the identical ability level (a¯) across the population, we have identified two possible
steady states, assuming the conditions in Proposition 1 are satisfied. Denoting them by El and Eh, they
are El(0, δ¯′ + f ′0) and Eh(1, δ¯
′ + f ′0 + q
′). To examine the converging dynamic paths to the steady states,
we need a phase diagram with direction arrows, which are displayed in Figure 3, in which the four dynamic
regimes are classified by the two straight lines, Πet = c0 − ψa¯− pst and Πet = δ¯′ + f ′0 + q′st. Let us denote the
intersection of the two straight lines by Em: Em(
c0−ψa¯−δ¯′−f ′0
p+q′ ,
p(δ¯′+f ′0)+q
′(c0−ψa¯)
p+q′ ). The two converging paths to
Eh and El spiral out of the intersection Em. The dynamic path converging to Eh above the two straight lines is
determined by the following dynamic system, s˙t = −αst+α and Π˙et = (ρ+α)Πet−qst− δ¯−f0 because of xt = 1
in the regime (equations (8) and (9)). The optimistic path is summarized by Πet =
q
ρ+2αst + δ¯
′ + f ′0 +
αq′
ρ+2α .
Also, the dynamic path converging to El below the two straight lines is determined by the dynamic system,
s˙t = −αst and Π˙et = (ρ + α)Πet − qst − δ¯ − f0 because xt = 0. This pessimistic path is summarized by
Πet =
q
ρ+2αst + δ¯
′ + f ′0. Therefore, we can calculate both the lower bound of st for the converging path to Eh
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and the upper bound of st for the converging path to El, denoted by eo and ep for each:

eo = max
{[
p+ qρ+2α
]−1 (
c0 − ψa¯− δ¯′ − f ′0 − αq
′
ρ+2α
)
, 0
}
ep = min
{[
p+ qρ+2α
]−1 (
c0 − ψa¯− δ¯′ − f ′0
)
, 1
}
.
(14)
With an initial social network quality s0 between the two bounds, s0 ∈ [eo, ep], two coordinated equilibrium
paths are available to the social group: the optimistic path to Eh and the pessimistic path to El. If the
coordinated expectation about the future is optimistic across the generations, the expected benefits of the
skill achievement at time zero (Πop0 ) are
q
ρ+2αs0 + δ¯
′ + f ′0 +
αq′
ρ+2α , and the expected benefits of the skill
achievement among the following newborn cohorts are greater than the level: Πopt > Π
op
0 ,∀t ∈ (0,∞). The
newborn cohort and all following cohorts invest in skills: xt = 1,∀t ∈ [0,∞), which means that the skill level
of the group st improves over time until it reaches one. However, if the coordinated expectation is pessimistic
across the generations, the expected benefits at the initial point (Πpe0 ) is
q
ρ+2αs0 + δ¯
′ + f ′0, which is smaller
than Πop0 by as much as
αq′
ρ+2α , and the expected benefits of investment among the following newborn cohorts
are smaller than the level for the current newborns: Πpet < Π
pe
0 ,∀t ∈ (0,∞). The newborn cohort and all
following cohorts do not invest in skills: xt = 0,∀t ∈ [0,∞), which means that the skill level of the group
deteriorates over time until it reaches zero.
Let us denote the range [eo, ep] by overlap, in which multiple coordinated equilibrium paths are available, as
suggested by Krugman (1991). Outside the overlap, a unique equilibrium path exists that is either optimistic
or pessimistic. If the initial network quality is good enough that s0 > ep, the only reasonable expectation
about the newborns’ investments is xt = 1,∀t ∈ [0,∞). If it is poor enough that s0 < eo, the only reasonable
expectation is xt = 0,∀t ∈ [0,∞).
The size of the overlap, denoted by L(≡ ep − eo), is essential to understand the characteristics of the
economy: L = α(ρ+2α)(α+ρ) pq +(α+ρ) , as far as eo, ep ∈ (0, 1). The bigger the L, the more likely it is that the
coordinated expectation about the future is critical in the determination of the final skill level of the group.
Because L is a decreasing function with respect to p/q, we have the following result.
Proposition 3. Given a unique innate ability level a¯ for all newborns, the size of overlap (L) is positively
related to the relative strength of the working period network externality in comparison with the education
period network externality (q/p). As the influence of the working period network externalities (q) increases
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and the influence of the education period network externalities (p) decreases, the more likely it is that the
coordinated expectation will determine the final state of a social group’s skill level instead of the history.
Moreover, the overlap does not exist under the absence of working period network externalities: L = 0
when q = 0. This means that the skill investment activities of the newborns are subject to the “past” if
network externalities are active only over the education period. That is, the initial quality of the social
network determines the future, and the belief coordination across the generations does not have an effect.
However, the size of the overlap is maximized under the absence of the education period network externality:
arg maxp L = 0,∀q ∈ (0,∞). The belief coordination across generations and the consequent collective action
are most crucial when network externalities are not active over the education period.
Suppose a group’s current skill level is in the overlap range. Then, the economic performance of the group
can be improved simply by increasing expectations of a brighter future. This rationalizes the arguments of
those who suggest that social groups are not constrained by their history but can raise themselves up “by
their bootstraps.” However, suppose that a group is poor enough that its current skill level (s0) is below
the lower bound of the optimistic path (eo). The group cannot escape its miserable condition through belief
coordination or collective actions among the group members. Under this situation, a disadvantaged group is
trapped by its own history.
Definition 1 (Poverty Trap). A social group is in the poverty trap if its network quality (s0) is below the
lower bound of the optimistic path: s0 < eo.
Consider two social groups, A and B, at the different steady states. Group A’s skill level is one, and
group B’s is zero. Assuming that the overlap range is between zero and one, group B is in the poverty trap
and group A is out of it. The disparity between the two groups cannot be overcome without governmental
intervention. Suppose that the government helps group B improve its skill level and enter the overlap range.
At this stage, the crucial point is the belief coordination among group B members. If optimism prevails, the
newborn cohorts invest in skills and the group’s skill level improves consistently up to the level of group A.
If pessimism prevails, the newborn cohorts do not invest in skills and the skill level can even deteriorate over
time until reaching group B’s original level of zero, making the earlier governmental intervention useless.
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5.2 Dynamic Paths with Ability Distribution G(a)
In this section, we confirm the findings presented in the earlier section using the more general form of the
ability distribution, S-shaped G(a). Suppose that the condition for multiplicity is satisfied in Theorem 1.
Suppose that the following three distinct steady states exist: El(sl,Πl), Em(sm,Πm) and Eh(sh,Πh), in
which sl < sm < sh. This is achieved with δ¯ ∈ (δ¯2, δ¯1) in Theorem 1. Using equations (8) and (9), s˙t is
positive (negative) above (below) the s˙t = 0 locus, Π˙et is positive (negative) above (below) the Π˙
e
t = 0 locus.
The phase diagram with direction arrows is displayed in Figure 4. The characteristics of the steady states are
summarized by the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Among the three steady states, El(sl,Πl), Em(sm,Πm) and Eh(sh,Πh), in which sl < sm < sh,
El and Eh are saddle points and Em is a source.
Proof. For the proof, see the appendix. 
We can identify the equilibrium path (saddle path) to each saddle point, El and Eh, as described in Figure
4. The equilibrium paths spiral out of a source Em. The lower bound of the optimistic path to Eh (eo) is
smaller than the upper bound of the pessimistic path (ep): eo < ep. Within the overlap range [eo, ep], multiple
coordinated equilibrium paths exist. If the coordinated expectation is optimistic, the upper path is taken and
the skill level approaches sh. If it is pessimistic, the lower path is taken and the skill level approaches sl.
Outside the overlap, a unique reasonable equilibrium path exists, which is either an optimistic path to sh or a
pessimistic path to sl. Thus, within the overlap, the coordinated expectation determines the final state, and
the history determines the final state outside the overlap.
The existence of the overlap range is related to the existence of working period network externalities. First,
consider the case where working period network externalities are absent (q = 0). Because the benefits of skill
acquisition are fixed as δ¯′ + f ′0 in this case, the expectation about the future does not play any role. This
is displayed in the phase diagram of Panel A in Figure 5 as the flat Π˙et = 0 locus (Π
e
t ≡ δ¯′ + f ′0) and the
non-existence of overlap, in which the final economic state depends entirely on the initial network quality of
the group. Also, the existence of the overlap range is guaranteed by the existence of working period network
externalities (q > 0). When the future benefits of skill acquisition are affected by the future network quality,
one’s skill investment should be influenced by other group members’ skill investments now and in the future.
Collective action to mange expectation can therefore play an important role in the determination of the overall
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skill investment rate among the newborn cohorts.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the condition in Theorem 1 is satisfied with δ¯ ∈ (δ¯2, δ¯1) such that there exist
three distinct steady states (El, Em and Eh). The overlap range does not exist under the absence of the
working period network externalities (q = 0), and it always exists with the existence of the working period
network externalities (q > 0).
Proof. For the proof, see the appendix. 
Furthermore, the size of the overlap is determined by the relative influence of the working period network
externalities over the education period network externalities. With the greater q, the size of the overlap tends
to be larger. This point is illustrated by the following theorem, which is consistent with the earlier result with
a unique ability level a¯ in Proposition 3.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the condition in Theorem 1 is satisfied with δ¯ ∈ (δ¯2, δ¯1) such that there exist
three distinct steady states (El, Em and Eh). With the increased influence of the working period network
externalities (greater q) while holding a steady state Em at (sm,Πm), the optimistic path to Eh with greater q
is placed above the original optimistic path to Eh for any st ≥ sm, and the pessimistic path to El with greater
q is placed below the original pessimistic path to El for any st ≤ sm (Refer to Panel B of Figure 5).
Proof. For the proof, see the appendix. 
The theorem also suggests that, given any initial s0 within the overlap, the difference between the expected
benefits of investments with an optimistic view (Πop0 ) and that with a pessimistic view (Π
pe
0 ) tends to be greater
with the increased influence of working period network externalities (greater q) because the distance between
the optimistic path and the pessimistic path gets wider: the greater Πop0 −Πpe0 with the greater q given p. This
means that, with the greater q relative to p, we are more likely to observe a greater difference in the newborns’
skill investment activities between the case with the coordinated optimism and that with the coordinated
pessimism because xop0 − xpe0 = G(A(s0,Πpe0 )) − G(A(s0,Πop0 )) in equation (3). This further illustrates that
the coordinated expectation can generate a greater difference in newborns’ skill investment activities with the
greater influence of working period network externalities relative to the education period network externalities.
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6 Policies Implications and Further Discussion
The developed dynamic model implies that if a social group is trapped by poor network quality, an effective
egalitarian policy of either social integration or affirmative action requires both active governmental interven-
tion and societal belief coordination to mobilize the group out of the poverty trap and to help it advance as
far as the advantaged group. A policy that fails in either respect would not be successful in eliminating a
persistent skill disparity between social groups. However, if the network quality of a disadvantaged group is
already in the overlap range, the active governmental intervention would not have a significant impact on the
advancement of the group. Instead, an emphasis on coordinated optimism should be pursued, although this
point is often ignored in policy debates. Collective action to manage expectation can generate a significant
impact on behavioral changes among young members of the disadvantaged group.
During the Jim Crow period of US history and until the civil rights movement in the 1960s, African
Americans were segregated from whites and discriminated against in an overt manner in the US labor market.
Although overt discrimination decreased in recent decades, we still observe persistent skill disparities between
the blacks and the whites. In particular, Black youths have significantly lower academic achievement than
white youths. The dynamic model in this paper suggests that Blacks with more low-skilled people in their
social network tend to be trapped by the adverse effects of poor network quality in the segregated American
society. Further, the model implies that the optimistic coordinated expectation is important for behavioral
changes among Black youth. The persistent group disparity that occurs in many other segregated societies
including South Africa, Australia and many countries in Latin America may also be attributable to the poverty
trap through the social externalities channel and the failure of belief coordination.
So far we have not discussed fully the spiraling out equilibrium paths. There often exist multiple points
of lifetime benefits of skill investment (Π0) that are available given an initial skill level (s0) even on the same
equilibrium path. For instance, as denoted in Figure 3, the group with a certain skill level may choose either
point a and point b (or others if available) on the optimistic path. What would make the difference between
choosing point a or choosing point b? The answer is related to the expectation about the length of time to
arrive at high equilibrium state Eh. Choosing point a means that the group believes that the high network
quality will be realized as soon as it can be. With the high lifetime benefits of investment, the newborn cohorts
invest in skills right away: x0 = 1. This is a case of strong optimism. On the other hand, choosing point b
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means that the group believes that the high network quality may take longer to come. If they believe in that
way, the benefits of investment would be lowered and the newborn cohorts will not invest in skills: x0 = 0.
This causes the group skill level to drop for a while, even when they share the optimistic view that the group
will arrive at Eh in the long run. Therefore, this is a case of weaker optimism.
Finally, Adsera and Ray (1998) argue that overlap is generated only when agents have an incentive to choose
the option that offers less appealing benefits at the moment of decision. In our model, the incentive originates
in the overlapping generation structure. Since agents are given only one chance to choose their occupational
type at the early stage of their lives, they choose a type with less appealing benefits at the moment of the
skill investment decision while expecting greater benefits to accrue in his lifetime. The dynamic structure
with an overlapping generational framework provided here can be useful in the examination of other topics in
which external economies exist and populations are replaced by new cohorts. Hauk and Saez-Marti(2002)’s
work on the cultural transmission of corruption and Bisin and Verdier(2001)’s work on intergenerational
transmission of values adopt the similar structure though they do not explicitly analyze the existence of
multiple equilibrium paths and the size of overlap. We expect future theoretical works that include external
economies and overlapping generations to adopt the given dynamic structure.
7 Conclusion
The importance of social externalities in the skill acquisition stage has been extensively studied in the literature,
with the conclusion that history might be important in the determination of the skill acquisition equilibrium
in social groups. The importance of externalities in subsequent career stage has been less extensively studied
in this context. This paper examines the effect of coordinated expectation on the improvement of a group’
skill level under the presence of social externalities in both stages. The consideration of economic agents’
forward-looking behaviors contributed to the development of this dynamic model.
The model proves that the skill investment period network externality operates as a historical force that
restricts a group to be subject to the current network quality and that the working period network externalities
operate as a mobilization force that leads a group to enhance (shrink) the skill investment activities by
holding an optimistic (pessimistic) view about the future network quality. The relative strength of working-
period network externalities over the skill investment period network externalities determines the size of
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overlap(Krugman 1991). In terms of the policy perspectives, the model emphasizes that an effective policy to
mobilize a disadvantaged social group trapped by the negative influence of network effects first requires active
governmental intervention to enhance the group’s skill level to enter the “overlap”, and then requires societal
belief coordination for the collective optimism. A policy that fails in either respect may not be successful.
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8 Appendix: Proofs
8.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 1 indicates the slope of the s˙t = 0 locus can be represented by
dΠet
dst
∣∣
s˙t=0
= ψg(G−1(1−s)) − p, in which
dΠet
dst
∣∣
s˙t=0
=∞ as either s→ 0 or s→ 1. This implies that there must be at least one steady state. The slope
is minimized at sˆ(= 1−G(aˆ)) with its minimum ψg(aˆ) − p, and the slope is decreasing in (0, sˆ), and increasing
in (sˆ, 1). Therefore, if the slope of the Π˙et = 0 locus (q
′) is greater than the minimum ψg(aˆ) − p, we can find
two network quality levels, s1 and s2, with which the slopes of the two loci are equalized: ψg(G−1(1−s)) − p = q′
for s ∈ {s1, s2}, in which s1 < sˆ < s2. When the Π˙et = 0 locus is tangent to the s˙t = 0 locus at either s1 or s2,
the corresponding Π1 and Π2 on the s˙t = 0 locus are Πj = −ψG−1(1− sj)− psj + c0,∀j ∈ {1, 2}, because of
equations (10) and (12). Therefore, noting that the Π˙et = 0 locus shifts up with the greater δ¯, we can find the
corresponding δ¯1 and δ¯2 at s1 and s2: δ¯j(= Πj(ρ+α)−qsj−f0) = (ρ+α)(c0−ψG−1(1−sj)−(p+q′)sj−f ′0),∀j ∈
{1, 2}. Given the slope q′ of the Π˙et = 0 locus greater than ψg(aˆ) − p, there exist multiple steady states with
δ¯ ∈ [δ¯2, δ¯1] and the number of steady states is three with δ¯ ∈ (δ¯2, δ¯1).
If the slope of the Π˙et = 0 locus (q
′) is smaller than the minimum ψg(aˆ) − p, we have only one intercept
between the two loci for any level of δ¯, because the slope of the s˙t = 0 locus is greater than that of the Π˙et = 0
locus (q′) for any st ∈ (0, 1). In the same reason, if the slope of the Π˙et = 0 locus (q′) equals the minimum
ψ
g(aˆ) − p, the two loci cross each other only one time, because the slope of the s˙t = 0 locus is greater than that
of the Π˙et = 0 locus for any st ∈ (0, 1), except for st = sˆ. 
8.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Given the dynamic system in equations (8) and (9), its linearization around a steady state (s¯, Π¯) is
s˙t = α[−G′A′s − 1](st − s¯) + α[−G′A′Π](Πet − Π¯)
Π˙et = −f ′(st − s¯) + (ρ+ α)(Πet − Π¯).
The Jacobian matrix JE evaluated at a steady state is
JE ≡
−αG′A′s − α −αG′A′Π
−f ′ ρ+ α

(s¯,Π¯)
=
α · g(a˜′)pψ − α α · g(a˜′)ψ
−q ρ+ α

(s¯,Π¯)
,
, in which a˜′ = A(s¯, Π¯). Consequently, its transpose is trJE = α · g(a˜
′)p
ψ + ρ and the determinant is |JE | =
α(α+ρ)g(a˜′)
ψ
[
p+ q′ − ψg(a˜′)
]
. Since trJE is positive, every steady state is unstable. The slope of the s˙t = 0
locus is ψg(a˜′) − p (Lemma 1) and the slope of the Π˙et = 0 locus is q′. At the steady states El and Eh, the
slope of the s˙t = 0 locus is greater than the slope of the Π˙et = 0 locus: p+ q
′ < ψg(a˜′) . At the steady state Em,
the slope of the s˙t = 0 locus is smaller than the slope of the Π˙et = 0 locus: p + q
′ > ψg(a˜′) . Therefore, |JE | is
negative at El and Eh, and positive at Em, which implies El and Eh are saddle points and Em is a source. 
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8.3 Proof of Proposition 4
First, consider the case with q = 0. Since the net benefits of being skilled is δ¯ + f0 at each point of time, the
lifetime benefits for skill achievements is fixed as δ¯′ + f ′0 because Π
e
0 =
∫∞
0
(δ¯ + f0) · e−(ρ+α)τdτ , for any s0.
Therefore, there cannot be multiple choices of the level of Πe0 for any given s0. Second, consider the case with
q > 0. Consider an initial network quality s0 = sm+ and its converging sequences {sτ}∞0 to sh. Then, we have
Πop0 =
∫∞
0
[δ¯+f0+qsτ ]e−(ρ+α)τdτ >
δ¯+f0+q(sm+)
ρ+α because Π
op
0 =
δ¯+f0+q(sm+)
ρ+α +
∫∞
0
q(sτ−(sm+))e−(ρ+α)τdτ
and sτ > sm + ,∀τ ∈ (0,∞). Πop0 is above the Π˙et = 0 locus for s0 = sm +  for any small . Therefore,
the converging path to Eh is placed above the Π˙et = 0 locus around sm, implying eo < sm. Also, consider an
initial network quality s0 = sm −  and its converging sequences {sτ}∞0 to sl. Then, in the same way, we can
show that Πpe0 is below the Π˙
e
t = 0 locus for s0 = sm−  for any small . Therefore, the converging path to El
is placed below the Π˙et = 0 locus around sm, implying ep > sm. These imply the existence of an overlap in
the neighborhood of sm. 
8.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Holding a steady state Em at (sm,Πm) requires the Π˙et = 0 locus to pass through (sm,Πm) for different levels
of q: the combination (δ¯, q) should satisfy Πm = δ¯+f0+qsmρ+α . The q increase by ∆q must come with δ¯ decrease
by sm∆q: ∆δ¯ = −sm∆q. Note that the Π˙et = 0 locus is rotated in a counter-clockwise direction as displayed
in Panel B of Figure 5. We compare the converging dynamic paths in a dynamic system with q0 > 0 with
those in a dynamic system with q0 + ∆q. Let us denote two stable steady states in the dynamic system with
q0 by El(sl,Πl) and Eh(sh,Πh), and those in the system with q0 + ∆q by E′l(s
′
l,Π
′
l) and E
′
h(s
′
h,Π
′
h). The
Π˙et given q0 + ∆q, denoted by Π˙
e
t (q0 + ∆q), is smaller (greater) than the Π˙
e
t (q0) for any st > sm (st < sm),
because Π˙et (q0 + ∆q) is, using equation (9):
Π˙et (q0 + ∆q) = (ρ+ α)
[
Πet −
(δ¯ + ∆δ¯) + f0 + (q0 + ∆q)st
ρ+ α
]
= (ρ+ α)
[
Πet −
(δ¯ − sm∆q) + f0 + (q0 + ∆q)st
ρ+ α
]
= Π˙et (q0)−∆q(st − sm) (15)
There always exist sc ∈ (sm, sh) such that the optimistic path to Eh in the dynamic system with q0
intercepts the Π˙et = 0 locus in the dynamic system with q0 + ∆q at st = sc. Let us denote Π
op
t on the
optimistic path in the dynamic system with q0 (q0 + ∆q) by C (C ′) at st = sc , A (A′) at st = 1, and B (B′)
at st = sm. First, it is obvious that, over the range [sc, sh), the optimistic path to E′h with q0 + ∆q is
above the Π˙et = 0 locus with q0 + ∆q, and the optimistic path to Eh with q0 is below the Π˙
e
t = 0 locus
with q0 + ∆q. Secondly, we show that the optimistic path to E′h is above the optimistic path to Eh over the
range [sh, 1]. Consider a start point at st = 1: (1, x). In order that the path from the point in the dynamic
system with q0 + ∆q passes through Eh, x should be greater than A because the state moves down faster with
Π˙et (q0 + ∆q) < Π˙
e
t (q0). A
′ should be greater than x because the path from the point (1, A′) approaches E′h,
in which s′h > sh. Therefore, we have A
′ > x > A . The same logic can be applied for any st over the range
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[sh, 1]. Thus, the optimistic path to E′h is above the optimistic path to Eh at any st ∈ [sh, 1]. Lastly, we show
that the optimistic path to E′h is above the optimistic path to Eh over the range [sm, sc). Consider a start
point at st = sm: (sm, y). In order that the path from the point in the dynamic system with q0 + ∆q passes
through C, y should be greater than B because the state moves up more slowly with Π˙et (q0 +∆q) < Π˙
e
t (q0). B
′
should be greater than y because the path from the point (sm, B′) approaches (sc, C ′) and C ′ > C. Therefore,
we have B′ > y > B. The same logic can be applied for any st in the range [sm, sc). In sum, we conclude that
the optimistic path to E′h with q0 + ∆q is above the path to Eh with q0 for any st ≥ sm. In a symmetric way,
we can show that the pessimistic path to E′l with q0 + ∆q is below the path to El with q0 for any st ≤ sm. 
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Figure 1.  Steady States with Unique Ability Level
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Figure 2. Steady States with Ability Distribution G(a)
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Figure 3. Equilibrium Paths with Unique Ability Level
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Figure 4. Equilibrium Paths with Ability Distribution G(a)
πt
st=0 locus
.
Eh
Optimistic Path
Em
πt=0 locus
.
El
Pessimistic Path 
st=0 st=1
eo epsl sh
Overlap
Panel B q Increase by ∆ q
Figure 5. Different Levels of Working-period Network Externalities 
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